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Proceedings: Fourth International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering, St. Louis, Missouri, 
March 9-12, 1998. 
CASE HISTORIES OF DAMAGING EARTHQUAKES 
Walter W. Hays 
United States Geological Survey 
955 N a tiona! Center 
Reston, VA 20192 
ABSTRACT 
Paper No. 8.04 
This paper contains illustrative case histories of the principal "forensic lessons" learned from multidisciplinary postearthquake 
investigations [United States Geological Survey, 19931 of damaging earthquakes throughout the world. Since 1980, the most notable 
earthquakes include those that struck Kobe, Japan in 1995, Northridge, California in 1994, Hokka1do-Nansei-Oki, Japan and Kha1ari, India 
in 1993, Landers, California and Erzincan, Turkey in 1992, Costa Rica in 1991, the Philippines in 1990, Lorna Prieta, California in 1989, 
Spitak, Am1enia in 1988, Mexico in 1985, and El Asnam, Algeria and Irpinia, Italy in 1980. Individually and collectively, these 
earthquakes have served as scientific laboratories to show where things went wrong in the planning, siting, design, construction, and use 
of various types of buildings and lifeline systems founded on soil or rock both close to and far from the causative fault system. Tbey have 
shown that communities keep on making nine basic mistakes which cause damage to be exacerbated and failure modes to be repeated in 
earthquake after earthquake. 
KEYWORDS 
Postearthquake investigations, source directivity. transfer of stress, ground shaking, soil amplification, soil-structure resonance, 
liquefaction, landslides, tsunamis, aftershocks. 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of notable damaging earthquake disasters throughout 
the world have now been investigated by organized 
multidisciplinary teams of earth scientists, engineers, health care 
specialists, architects, planners, and emergency managers 
(Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 1991). These 
earthquakes have served as "scientific laboratories" for scientists, 
engineers, and others to acquire new perishable and non-
perishable data and to test theories, concepts, policies, and 
practices for siting, designing, and constructing various types of 
buildings and lifeline systems on soil or rock located close to 
and far from the causative fault system in low- as well as high-
seismicity regimes. 
These unplanned "scientific laboratories'' include the earthquake 
disasters that struck Kobe, Japan in 1995, Northridge, California 
in 1994, Hokkaido.Nansci-Oki, Japan and Khilari, lndia in 1993 
), Landers-Big Bear, California, Dashour, Egypt, off the coast or 
Nicaragua and Erzincan, Turkey in 1992, Costa Rica in 1991, 
Manji1, Iran and the Philippine Islands in 1990, Loma Prieta, 
California in 1989, Spitak, Armenia in 1988, Mexico in 1985, 
and El Asnam, Algeria and Irpinia, Ttaly in 1980. These and 
other scientific laboratories have shown what usually happens, 
\vhy certain damage patterns and damage modes keep recurring, 
and what is needed to reduce the vulnerability of buildings and 
lifeline systems m future earthquakes. They have highlighted 
the following mistakes made repeatedly in every country: 
I. Underestimating the strength, duration, and frequency 
composition of ground shaking. 
2. Failing to provide adequate lateral resistance. 
3. Lack of consideration of soil amplification and soil/structure 
resonance. 
4. Lack of consideration of the effects of shal1ow depths of 
focus, source directivity, or fault rupture. 
5. Ignoring the possibility oflong-duration acceleration pulses 
close to the causative fault. 
6. Failing to identitY soils and slopes susceptible to permanent 
ground displacement (i.e., liquefaction and/or landslides). 
7. Introduction ofasynunetry, irregularity, and horizontal and 
vertical discontinuities in mass, strength, and stiffness in the 
building configuration during the design phase. 
8. Ignoring the possibility of hammering by adjacent structures 
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during urban planning. 
9. Ignoring the possibility of tsunami flood waves at coastal 
locations. 
Sixteen "earthquake laboratories'' representing different cultural 
and tectonic settings are summarized below to illustrate the 
range and commonality of the lessons that can benefit all 
nations. 
January 17. 1995 Great Hyogo-Ken Nambu Japan (Kobe) 
Earthquake [Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 19951 
This M 6.9 earthquake, \Vhich occurred at 5:46a.m. 20 km from 
Kobe on a right-lateral-strike-slip fault instead of the expected 
scenario of a similar or larger magnitude subduction zone 
earthquake located much farther away in the trench, is 
representative of the type of urban earthquake disaster that can 
be expected when a combination of negative geotechnical factors 
are involved. The negative factors in this case included: I) a 
damaging level magnitude, 2) an epicenter close to Kobe, 3) a 
relatively shallow depth of focus, 4) fault rupture directivity 
effects focused toward Kobe, 5) enhanced ground shaking due 
to amplification of soft soils underlying much of Kobe, and 6) 
liquefaction and lateral spreading of man made soils in the port 
area. The surprises included: 1) the extent of the damage of the 
elevated Hanshin expressway, 2) the nature and extent of the 
damage to the port facilities, 3) the collapse of so many single 
family dwellings, 4) damage to welded steel frame buildings, 
and 5) the long duration acceleration pulse in the ground motion. 
The economic losses are believed to have exceeded $140 billion; 
deaths, 5,600, and injuries, 26, 000; and a homeless toll of over 
250,000. The disaster led to a renewed effort by the Japanese 
Government to implement improved earthquake loss prevention 
and mitigation measures and to strengthen earthquake 
preparedness and emergency response. 
January 1 7. 1994 Northridge California Ea1ihquake [State of 
California, 1995] 
"This M 6.7 earthquake, which occurred at 4:31 a.m., illustrates 
what can happen in the epicentral area of an urban earthquake 
generated on a "blind" thrust fault. It is representative of the 
least frequent but most destructive as a single event of the three 
types of scenario earthquakes that are being used at present tOr 
risk assessments and to increase preparedness and to foster 
mitigation in the Los Angeles area. In this case, instead of "the 
big one" caused by rupture of the San Andreas fault or a 
moderate one caused by rupture of the Newport-Englewood 
fault, a blind thrust fault ruptured in response to the ongoing 
north-south compression caused by the big bend in the San 
Andreas fault system which marks the active boundary of the 
North American and Pacific plates. The earthquake, which did 
not rupture the surface, produced several "surprises": 1) 
verification of the web of "blind thrust faults" beneath Los 
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Angeles, one of which produced the 1971 San Fernando 
earthquake, 2) the exceptionally strong horizontal and vertical 
ground accelerations in a 20 x 20 square kilometer epicentral 
area which approached 2 g, a factor of more than 2 greater than 
the expected level of ground shaking and the actual design value 
prescribed in the building code, 3) ground motion characterized 
by a long duration acceleration pulse (i.e., the 11 killer" pulse), 4) 
damage to elevated highway systems, and 5) damage to welded 
moment steel frame buildings. Economic losses reached $ 40 
billion with overS 12 billion in insured losses; mortality 61, 
injured 15,000, and homeless over 50,000. 
September 29 1993 Kllalari India Earthquake [The Society for 
Earthquake and Civil Engineering Dynamics, 1993] 
TI1is M 6.3 earthquake is representative of the type of infrequent, 
but devaslating moderate magnitude intraplate earthquakes that 
can occur in a low seismicity region on a shallow unkno\\11 fault 
system. This earthquake was a "surprise," not only because it 
occurred at great distance from the well known active 
Himalayan seismic belt in India's northern border region, but 
also because it happened at 3:46 a. m. on a Wednesday while 
people were sleeping in the supposed "sccurity 11 of their 
umeinforced masonry homes typically having heavy stone roofs. 
This type of construction is well known for its vulnerability to 
earthquake ground shaking, but, because of the low seismicity, 
the potential risk was considered "acceptable." The end result is 
that they were not designed to withstand the level of strong 
ground shaking that occurred. Not a single house remained 
standing in Khilari. The estimated death toll reached at least 
23000. 
July 12 1993 Ilokkaido-Nansei-Oki Japan Earthquake 
This M 7.S earthquake, which occurred at 10:17 p.m. near 
Okushiri Island in the Japan Sea 30 km off the coast of 
southwest Hokkaido, is typical of subduction events along the 
recently recognized subduction plate boundary along the Japan 
Sea coast of northern Honshu and llokkaido. Property loss was 
estimated at $ 600 million, and 197 were killed. Aonae, a small 
town of 500 on the southern end of Okushiri comprised mainly 
of 1-2 story buildings or wood post and beam construction, was 
heavily damaged from the ground shaking, tsunami flood waves, 
liquefaction, lateral spreads, loss of bearing strength, settlement, 
landslides, and a fire that started at 10:40 p.m. Because of the 
short source distance, tsunami warnings were ineffective for 
Aonac. \Vithin 2-5 minutes after the earthquake, the largest 
tsunami flood waves ever to strike Japan began to arrive on the 
east coast of Okushiri whi1e the ground was still shaking and at 
other locations within approximately 2 minutes after the shaking 
had stopped. Flood waves ranged from a vertical run up of 15 
to 30m in a 20 km portion of the southern portion of Okushiri 
Island and 10m or less on the northern and western portions of 
the Island. The directivity of the fault rupture caused the 
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duration of high frequency ground shaking, estimated to have 
reached 0.4 to 0.5 gat Aonac, to range from 1-2 minutes and to 
be longer east of the epicenter than in other directions. Because 
of the 30 km epicentral distance, engineered structures were not 
as vulnerable to ground shaking as they were to tsunami flood 
waves. The Japan Meteorological Agency issued a tsunami 
warning five minutes after the earthquake that a major (i.e., over 
3m) tsunami had been generated. Although the warning, which 
was issued through local television and radio stations, came too 
late to benefit the local populace, many of them were saved 
because they had run immediately for higher ground on the basis 
of past experience. 'Ibe warnings were useful for other 
locations. The tsunami reached Russia in 20 minutes and South 
Korea in 90 minutes with wave run ups of 1-4 m in Russia and 
1-2m in South Korea 
September 2 1992 Offshore ~~icaraG"ua Earthquake 
This M 7.0 earthquake. which occurred 120 km (70 miles) \\'est-
southwest of Managua at 6:45 p. m., is representative of what 
can be expected in the complex tectonic area where the Pacific, 
Caribbean, Cocos, and North American plates are converging. 
This event was not a subduction event, and apparently had a 
shallow focal depth. It produced a "surprise", in terms of its 
relatively small magnitude and the fact that it was not a 
subduction event, when it generated a tsunami which caused 8 
m (30 foot) vertical flood wave run up that extended more than 
1 km (0.5 mile) along a 330 km (200 miles) stretch of the Pacific 
coast. This stretch of the coast ranging fforn Porto de Corinto to 
the north to San Juan del Sur near the border with Coasta Rica. 
is comprised mainly of fishing villages and small resorts. The 
town of Masachapa, located 58 km (35 miles) southwest of 
Managua with a population of 25,600, was devastated by the 
tsunami flood waves which struck without any warning except 
the "noise of death" heard when the flood waves arrived at the 
coast. The known tolls were an estimated 500 deaths, many 
injuries, and 16,046 homeless. 
October 11. 1992 Dashour. Egypt Earthquake 
This M 5.9 earthquake, which occurred at 3:12 p. m., is 
representative of the type of infrequent,_ moderate-magnitude, 
but very damaging intraplate earthquakes that can occur in this 
part of the northeast corner of the African plate. Regional 
seismicity is controlled by the following plate boundaries: I) to 
the north, the African and Eurasian plates which converge ncar 
Cyprus, 2) to the northeast, the Arabian and African plates, 
which are separated by the Levant transform, and 3) to the cast 
and southeast, the Arabian and African plates, which are 
separated by the Red Sea spreading zone. TI1e earthquake was 
located 25 km ( 15 miles) from Cairo, which has a population of 
14 million and a very large inventory of non-engineered 
dwellings, buildings, and infrastructure. The earthquake 
demonstrated the well known vulnerability of unreinforced 
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masonry buildings to ground shaking. Over 1 ,000 buildings, 
including a 14-story apartment building at Heliopolis which 
collapsed, many schools, and monuments were badly damaged. 
"Jbe economic toll reached $ 2 billion; over 700 were killed, and 
over 2,000 were injured. At the time of the earthquake, Egypt 
had not adopted a seismic building code, although one had been 
proposed in 1991 hy the Egyptian Earthquake Engineering 
Society. 
June 2S-29 1992 Landers-Big Bear California Earthquakes 
Located on different strike slip fault systems, these two 
earthquakes are representative of what should be expected along 
the Pacific and North American plate boundary in Southern 
Califomia. Although rural earthquakes, they are important 
because of thelr contribution to the understanding of geologic 
processes in Southern California, the physics of surface fault 
rupture, transfer of stress to adjacent fault systems, and ground 
shaking; validation of damage from surface fault rupture; and 
calibration of the response of base-isolated buildings to strong 
ground shaking. The nature of their occurrence led to a new 
hypothesis that they may depict the San Andreas fault system 
attempting to cut a new path to get around the "big bend" in 
southern California. Landers (M 7 .4), which occurred at 4:58 
a. m., was the largest earthquake to occur in California since 
1952. It generating right-lateral strike-slip surface fault rupture 
that extended northward for 85 km, staning on the Johnson 
Valley fault and continuing in a series of easterly steps across the 
Homestead Valley, Emerson, and Camp Rock faults. The Big 
Bear earthquake had a magnitude of 6.5 and occurred at 8.04 a. 
m.. More than 250 strong motion records were recorded from 
the t\vo earthquakes wilh the Landers records characterized by 
long duration acceleration (i.e., "the killer pulse") and directivity 
effects, which were more pronounced in the direction of fault 
rupture. The records in the Law and Justice Center in San 
Bernardino County demonstrated the effectiveness of base 
isolation systems. In San I3ernardino County, 77 homes were 
destroyed, 4.369 \\'ere damaged, and mobile homes were shown 
to be especially vulnerable to ground shaking. Ninety homes 
·were damaged by surface fault mpture. Nearly all of these 
houses were built before the Alquist-Priolo Act was enacted into 
law in 1988. This Act required the California Division of Mines 
and Geology to construct special study zones to identify faults 
having the potential for surface rupture. All of the houses that 
were damaged would have been required to have a 50 foot 
setback from the fault zones that ruptured, of which 60% were 
recognized in field mapping. Only 1 death and 397 injuries 
were reported Losses were estimated at $ I 00 million. 
March 13 1992 Erzincan Turkey Earthg,uake 
This M 7.1 earthquake, which occurred at 7:19 p. m., ruptured 
the same segment of the 1,000-km-long (600 miles) North 
Anatolian fault zone marking the boundary of the Eurasian and 
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Arabian plates tbat ruptured on December 26, 1939, in the M 8.0 
Erzincan-Rafahiye earthquake. Surface fault rupture of 20 km 
(12 miles) was observed. The earthquake was like a "mini 
Mexico City 11 event, because it exJXlsed the vulnerability of 
unreinforced masonry and non-ductile concrete buildings in a 
125 km by 80 km (75 mrles by 48 miles) alluvial valley which 
amplified ground motions in the 0.3-0.5 second range. Many of 
the 300 collapsed buildings, which included housing, schools, 
hospitals, and hotels, were 3-5 stories in height, underlain by soft 
alluvium , and susceptible to soil/structure resonance. The 
societal impacts were 653 dead, 3,850 injured, and about 50,000 
homeless. 
Amil22. !991 Coasta Rica Earthquake 
This M 7.6 earthquake, which occurred at 3:55 p. m., is 
representative of the type of earthquakes that occur in 
conjunction with interactions of the Caribbean, North American, 
and Cocos plates. The earthquake demonstrated the 
vulnerability of unreinforccd masonry buildings (homes, hotels) 
and bridges to ground shaking, highways to liquefaction, 
cracking, and landslides, underground utilities to ground failure, 
and ports, like Puerto Limon, to liquefaction and lateral spreads. 
Puerto Viejo and Cahota arc examples of beach towns that were 
isolated when the only highway connecting them was made 
impassable because of landslides or damage to bridges. The 
death toll was 52. 
July 16 1990 Luzon. Philiouines Earthquake 
This M 7.7 earthquake, which occurred at 4:26 P- m., is 
representative of the type of earthquakes that are generated in 
this high seismicity region by t\\'0 co1liding plates: the 
Philippines Sea plate moving northwest and the Eurasian plate 
moving southeast. The Philippine Islands have a population of 
about 60 million with Luzon having about 4 million at risk to 
earthquakes which strike at frequent intervals. The earthquake 
was generated by slip on the 1,000-km-long, left-lateral, strike-
slip Philippines fault which marks the interface of the colliding 
plates. Severe damage occurred in urban centers such as 
Dagupan, Gerena, Agoo, and Baguio, all of which are underlain 
by soft soils. In Dagupan, hotels eo1lapsetl from the ground 
shaking and the central business district was destroyed by 
extensive settlement of 1 m or more and liquefaction. The toll 
was at least 1,700 deaths, 3,500 injured, and 27,000 homeless. 
June 21. 1990 Manjil Iran Earthquake 
This M 7.5 to 7.7 earthquake is representative of earthquakes 
occurring in the Zagros folded belt, the most active 
seismotectonic region oflran. ·lbc earthquake demonstrated the 
vulnerability of unreinforced masonry houses and buildings to 
ground shaking and the dcstmctiveness of landslides. Houses 
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and infrastructure were shown to be especially vulnerable to 
rock falls triggered by the !,'TOund shaking. An estimated 50,000 
were killed. 
October 17. 1989 Lorna Prieta California Earthquake [State of 
California, 1990] 
This M 7.1 earthquake, with an epicenter centered in a rural 
locat1on 60 miles from San Francisco and Oakland, is 
representative of the type of earthquakes that occur along the 
right-lateral-strike~slip San Andreas fault zone in Northern 
California marking the active boundary of the North American 
and Pacific tectonic plates some distance from major urban 
centers. This earthquake occurred at 5:07 p. m. after many 
people had left work in San Francisco and Oakland to attend the 
World Series or to watch it at home on television. It destroyed 
unreinforccd masonry buildings, damaged bridge systems, 
ruptured underground utilities, and left 63 dead, 11,000 injured, 
and 25,000 homeless in parts of San Francisco, Oakland, and 
other urban centers. Direct losses reached $8 billion. Many of 
the strong ground motion records acquired in the earthquake 
demonstrated the increased vulnerability ofbuildings and lifeline 
systems founded on soft Bay mud and land fill to enhanced 
ground shaking and permanent ground failure. It also 
demonstrated the fragility of unreinforced masonry buildings, 
elevated highway overpasses, airport runways, and underground 
pipelines to ground shaking, liquefaction, and lateral spreading, 
and reminded San Francisco of the continuing susceptibility of 
the Marina District and other areas to fire and lateral spreading. 
December 7. 1988 Spitak, Armenia Earthquake [Earthquake 
Engineering Research Institute, 1989b] 
cl11iS M 6.9 earthquake which occurred at 11 :41 a. m. local time 
is representative of what can be expected from the ongoing 
collision of the Eurasian and Arabian tectonic plates. The 
earthquake exposed the we11 known lack of earthquake resiliency 
in old unreinforced masonry, but it presented a 11 Surprise 11 when 
many new pre-cast reinforced concrete frame buildings 
collapsed. The ground motion levels in the epicentral region 
exceeded the design values due to soil amplification and 
proximity to the causative thrust fault. Schools and hospitals 
were also shown to be especially vulnerable. The death toll is 
believed to have reached at least 25,000 and the cost of 
reconstruction $16 billion. 
September 19 1985 Michiocan (Mexico> Earthquake 
[Earthquake_(Engineering Research Institute, 1989a] 
This M 8.1 earthquake, which occurred at 7:18 a. m., is 
representative of the great earthquakes that can be expected as 
a consequence of the ongoing subduction of the Cocos plate 
beneath the North American plate. The earthquake 
demonstrated the well known vulnerability to ground shaking of 
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5-20 story unrcinforced masonry, non-ductile concrete, and 
reinforced concrete buildings (including hospitals, schools, and 
government buildings) located in the old lake bed zone of central 
Mexico City, the World's most populous urban center. Soil 
amplification, soil/structure resonance, and liquefaction 
contributed to the collapse of 5,728 buildings located in and 
adjacent to the old lake bed zone, a small fraction of the more 
than 1 million existing engineered buildings in Mexico City. As 
expected, the ground shaking recorded by accelerographs on 
frrm soil in Mexico City generated by an earthquake located 400 
k:rn (250 miles) from the city in the subduction zone was low, in 
the order of 3% g. However, the soft soils underlying buildings 
constructed in the old lake bed amplified the firm soil ground 
motions for fundamental periods centered ncar 2 seconds by a 
factor of 5 or more to the order of 18 % g. The combination of 
soil amplification and soil/structure resonance caused the lateral 
load to exceed the capacity of many 5-20 story buildings located 
in the Old lake bed zone. .The vulnerability to fire was 
demonstrated when fires broke out in 350 places. An estimated 
10,000 to 40,000 people were killed, 25,000 were injured, 
200,000 were left homeless, and economic losses reached at least 
$5 billion. Design norms in effect for construction in and 
adjacent to the old lake bed zone at the time of the earthquake 
were changed after the disaster to increase the earthquake 
resilience of new construction. 
November 15 1980 Iruinia, Italy Earthquake 
This M 6.9 earthquake, which occurred at 7:34 p. m. is 
representative of the normal faulting earthquakes that can be 
expected in Central Italy. The earthquake exposed the 
vulnerabilities of isolated mountain villages crowning the 
mountain tops, steep roads susceptible to blockage by landslides, 
narrow streets susceptible to closure by debris, and old 
unreinforced masonry buildings and nonductile concrete 
buildings susceptible to damage and collapse from ground 
shaking. The earthquake left economic losses of$ 3 billion, 5, 
000 dead, and 9,000 injured. 
October 10. 1980 El Asnam. Algeria Earthuuake [Hays, W. W. 
and Rouhban, B. M , 1991 J 
This M 7.3 earthquake \Vhich occurred on a Friday_(i.e., the 
11Weekend ") is typical of the type of earthquakes that can be 
expected as a consequence of the ongoing collision of the 
Eurasian and African tectonic plates. The earthquake exposed 
the lack of earthquake resilience of existing as well as new 
buildings that were not designed to withstand the level of strong 
horizontal and vertical ground shaking that occurred in the 
epicentral region of the causative thrust fault. An estimated 
9,612 people were killed or injured and the direct losses are 
believed to have reached $ 2 billion. Reconstruction was frozen 
until a seismic zonation study of ten urban centers could be 
completed and implemented through new building regulations 
and land use plans 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The postearthquake investigations have pointed out the mistakes 
that, either singly or collectively, have increased the 
vulnerability of physical elements in the community to the 
physical effects of the earthquake (i.e., to ground shaking, 
ground failure, surface fault rupture, tectonic deformation, 
aftershocks, tsunami nood waves, and fire following 
earthquake), and contributed to earthquake disasters. In many 
countries, these mistakes have been recognized and steps are 
being taken to adopt avoidance strategies or counter measures by 
integrated changes in planning, siting, design, construction, and 
land-use practices. The new avoidance strategies are: 
1. A void sites having the potential for enhanced ground shaking 
from soil amplification and increased damage from the 
frequency-dependent resonance of soils and structures having 
similar fundamental periods of vibration (c. g., Mexico, Spitak, 
Loma Prieta, and Erzincan). 
2. Avoid sites having soils that either can liquify or that are 
unstable and susceptible to large permanent displacements (e. g., 
Costa Rica, the Philippines, Lorna Prieta, and Kobe). 
3. Avoid sites having the potential for surface fault rupture (e. 
g., Landers) 
4. A void sites on coasts susceptible to tsunami flood wave run 
up (e. g., Hokkaido-Nansci-Oki, Nicaragua). 
5. Avoid sites where the severity, frequency composition, and 
duration of the lateral forces of ground shaking are enhanced by 
proximity to the causative fault, or by the effects of topography 
or source directivity (e. g., Kobe, Northridge, Lorna Prieta, 
Spitak, Erzincan, El Asnam, and Irpinia). 
6. A void sites where earthquake ground shaking effects are 
intensified by shallow brittle-ductile transition zones (e. g., 
Khalari and Kobe). 
7. Avoid locations where structures are susceptible to pounding 
from adjacent structures (e. g., Mexico). 
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